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Book Review

Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation
of Prosperity
REVIEWED BY THOMAS MAXWELL*

FUKUYAMA, FRANCIS, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE
CREATION OF WEALTH; The Free Press, New York, NY (1995).
($24.50); ISBN 0-02-910976-0; 457pp. (hardcover).
When people ask me where I stand on the issue of fences and
neighbors in my poem 'Mending Wall", I simply point out to them that
the two key lines - "Something there is that does not love a wall", and
'Good fences make good neighbors" - appear an equal number of times
each, and I leave it at that. Robert Frost.
Modern cosmologists ask us to picture a saddle-shaped universe,
where time and space are curved essences. Francis Fukuyama, in
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Wealth, his first book
since his seminal post-Cold War work, The End of History and the Last
Man, suggests the consideration of saddle-shaped societies. With
strong families on one end and strong governments on the other,
Fukuyama contends that these societies lack structures of independent
sociability substantial enough to support their economic aspirations.
Thus saddle-shaped societies are in peril. Their economies are limited
by the inability to bridge the gap between tightly family-oriented businesses, which tend to burn out as family situations change over the
generations, and businesses which are really government ministries,
centrally controlled and regulated, pursuing goals which are absolute
and too often arbitrary.
Conversely, full, rounded societies develop modern, world-class
economies marked by possession of the greatest economic good, "scale".
These societies are characterized by self-regulation and independence
from absolute government control as well as continuous landscapes of
socializing opportunities free from narrow determination by familial or
* Professor of English, Red Rocks Community College; MHA, University of
Colorado.

423

DENV. J. INTL L. & POLY

VOL. 25:2

family-based proscription. This time-space warp Fukuyama calls
"trust", a concrete, tangible noun. From this larger category, two subcategories are formed: saddle-shaped societies, based on "low-trust",
and round societies, based on "high-trust". Using this hypothesis,
Fukuyama concludes that certain emerging economies, which at a
glance seem destined to join the big three - The United States, Japan, and Germany - as market-makers and market-controllers, are in
fact bound to peak at lesser levels because they will hit saddle-shaped
ceilings inherent in their societies. Korea and Taiwan/China he places
in this category. Other fully-vested economies - France and Italy are
those he treats in depth - are already experiencing this problem, because they too are low-trust.
If readers disagree that economies-of-scale are sine qua non to toptier success, they will disagree entirely with Fukuyama's hypothesis.
If, on the other hand, the necessity of developing scale seems selfevident to readers, they will have little choice but to follow the author
in his claims. Trust is that sort of book which is hypothesis-driven and
simplistic, lending itself to thumbs-up or thumbs-down judgements. As
a scholarly technique, this is rather bold, standing in contrast to the
majority of today's cutting-edge economic theories, which take complexity to levels of ambiguity and equivocation unheard of a few generations ago. Most modern economics is statistics and calculus on steroids, post-Euclidean blurs rather than structures, penumbra rather
than focus. Fukuyama, however, is calm and consistent, gracefully
dedicated to testing his insular hypothesis under idealized, almost laboratory conditions. He doesn't allow any troublesome slippery-slope
spectra of conflicting variables to compromise the edges of his research, nor does he attempt to scour the entire global panorama with
exhaustive vigilance. Instead, he lets the simplicity of his high-trust/
low-trust hypothesis fill the available space, and the limited specimen
countries speak for themselves (the reader must decide if the choices
represent a wider field).
Fukuyama manages his presentation by sweeping his focus back
and forth among his target countries. His most interesting revelation,
the broadest leap in the book against the grain of popular wisdom, is
also his most expressive of his overall method. He states that the undisputed all-time best bumper-sticker message of America -that it is a
nation of individualists, and that fact misstates the truth by 180 degrees. Instead, the truth is, our rich custom of voluntary socialization
accounts for its greatness. Americans grant each other enough trust so
that a spontaneous sense of common existence leads to a sense of common purpose and a decision for common action. Thus, Americans can
create vast, sophisticated industries populated by aggressively competing autonomous companies, without depending on governmental or
family-based master-planning to do so.
This is how American society rounds out the saddle-shaped gap.
Other successful countries reach generally the same destination by va-
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rious other routes. It's important to readers of Trust to envision this.
Fukuyama, as a figure in intellectual history, is still young and lacks
the daring to pursue the social ethic very deep into the cultural woods.
He points to the obvious, countable things, like the boy scouts, various
societies, and the Protestant church tradition. In his End of History
mantle, Fukuyama tracked this phenomenon back to its intellectual
head-waters. In the case of the Protestant ethic, for instance, one
might revisit the Protestant Reformation, adding to the audiences'
knowledge the connection between that and the humanist Renaissance.
But to his credit, Fukuyama acknowledges in his introduction that his
present topic of economics grew out of his previous book on civil governance as its natural offspring, and that his approach is essentially
intuitive, more Tarzan than Erasmus.
His swing through the treetops of Japanese society, especially as
it's evolved since World War II, is perhaps his best observation. He describes transformations to the faintly lit - to the West - social profile
of Japan as evolving in a manner that the casual observer might quite
miss. Fukuyama's handling of the transformation from the pre-war
zaibatsu system of commercial networking to the post-war construct of
keiretsu, reveals why the Japanese practice the art of dissembling
before all else. His snapshot of mid-nineties Japan shows a welltempered meritocracy which is taking full advantage of the elaborate
social trust the nation enjoys. This results in vast prairie-like expanses
of horizontal commercial structuring the likes of which the world is
not likely to see again for quite awhile.
Countries which show insufficient evidence of ample social capital
to Fukuyama, like Korea with its over dependence on governmental
planning, and Taiwan, which is tightly locked into a family-business
commercial structure. About France and Italy, Fukuyama will have
some readers scrambling for their globes, wondering why he is talking
about places which they don't find even vaguely familiar. Fukuyama
comes very close to making facile judgements even about French wine,
much less French society.
Fukuyama does not condemn as infertile the many spreading deltas of contemporary theories which are based on inclusiveness and diversity; he implies instead that the foundational mainstream is more
important to watch than all the sidestreams combined. He declines to
speculate that there might be something in human affairs that succeeds better than success itself. His deepest and most resonant implication is that there is a secret to success which is within the reach of
every society: as long as they realize the saddle-shaped declivities in
their social infrastructures can be filled and rounded, a way can be
found to express the will. "Maturity" might sum his message up the
best. The extended families and controlling governments are like parents, and societies are their children. If the parents don't "let go", the
child will never grow into maturity and thrive. Societies must ramify
and proliferate without umbilical obligations calling the tune. One of
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Fukuyama's boldest moves is to emphasize "society" at the expense of
its more modish sibling "culture." "Society" seems rather plain by comparison. "Culture" wears the costumes and lights the candles and sings
the hymns, after all. Fukuyama is merely saying that there is a bus
called "modernity," and societies best hustle to catch it, whatever their
cultures might be.
"Modernity" stands as large in Trust as trust itself What is modernity's logical opposite? Nostalgia, authoritarianism, pyramided tradition? Based on his lack of treating this matter as a topic unto itself,
one might infer that Fukuyama doesn't seem to care. Of course, in order to correct itself, any given culture must examine how it uniquely
hamstrings its society, and culture-by-culture examinations occupy a
good portion of the book; but, then, every form of flabbiness requires
the application of some form of fitness regimen, and articulating the
tedious specifics is not the true vocation of the fitness-itself theorist.
Fukuyama's modernity is fitness in the other metaphorical sense
as well, the Darwinian sense, because he more than implies that he
foresees an era coming in which the economic margins, occupied by
lesser, non-scale players, will be narrower and more parsimonious
than they are now: a country must "emerge" all the way or risk sinking back quite severely. It is on this score that most of the criticism
that Trust has collected around the world settles. Can it seriously be
suspected, the critics ask, that in an era of rising global prosperity,
measured in total wealth and number of transactions, that France, Italy, Korea, and China will command smaller and smaller pieces of the
pie, while those of Japan, the US, and Germany grow? That seems
preposterous on its face. And if a single given theory of determination
were to predict such a state of affairs, wouldn't it have to be one of
those Universal Field Theory jobs that does it, bursting with
supply/demand curves, comparative advantage evaluations, behavior
theory, and technology-impact factors? Mere details, Fukuyama's book
replies.
More intriguing to this reviewer than taking issue with his appraisal of particular social trust situations, is to explore the notion of
trust as behavior. The book invites this, even if its author does not.
Fukuyama postulates a rather humble definition of trust, borrowing
freely and openly from previous sources, citing as well figures on the
kinds of non-familial and non-governmental organizations in which
members of various societies participate. His hypothesis evolves eventually to the topic of trust in the workplace, wherein vertically organized, task-oriented operations, the great majority of their employees
having no say in any corporate decisions, are found inferior to firms
with more horizontal, involving, participatory structures. He looks
with approval on the fact that the general trend in the United States
is a movement from the former to the latter, though he finds ours still
lagging behind Japan's efforts. The trend in America is not moving fast
enough for his liking, however, and in fact he worries that it might be
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slowing down as a consequence of an evident dwindling of trust in our
society. Not unlike most social commentators, or just about anyone else
for that matter, Fukuyama sees a serious threat to our society in statistics documenting crime, violence, incivility, moral indifference and
nihilism, educational decline, and all the other distressingly familiar
problems we face. Similarly, increasing levels of litigation, more,
America's increasing tendency to view all human interaction as potentially actionable, as describable at any point in terms of the criminal
code, common law, the bill of rights, contract law, or whatever,
Fukuyama also red-tags as a sign of a lowering level of trust among
us.
If he's right about litigiousness representing lowering trust, one
should be alarmed, of course. Then again, he doesn't venture to suggest how the coming into existence of an all-pervasive legalistic atmosphere could be reversed, and how things would be if it were. How
many people would voluntarily opt for less legal protection than they
enjoy now, merely for the purpose of demonstrating they are more
trusting and trustworthy? It might be argued, in fact, that mutual, aggressive legalistic behavior actually limits legalism taking over our
lives, since so often "due process" and "stalemate" amount to one and
the same thing (while "settlement" and "collecting" often do not). And
might it not be argued even more fundamentally that a hearty legal
environment actually promotes and reflects a very high level of social
trust, real trust that is? An ability to maintain personal space through
rule of law in a complex, crazy, and changing society could be our
highest achievement as a people. Perhaps here Fukuyama's minimalist
hypothesis fails him. He doesn't seem interested in seeing trust as the
bedrock foundation for us to build upon, and its unquestionable existence as that which keeps our many and various palaces of individualism, diversity, and even acrimony from falling down.
What is more, he relegates to problematic limbo the fact that the
destinies of individual countries are becoming interwoven in a global
tapestry that displays patterns in which strength and weakness are
sometimes juxtaposed so as to reverse roles. Trust, as the whole world
turns, is but an orphan in the storm, it often seems, too frail and pathetic for even Diogenes to query in his search for the honest man.
"The end of history" means, I believe, the end of the horrid, selfannihilating strife which has been the lot of humankind since before
history began. The winter of our discontent is maybe finally passing
on, and the season of renewal, of flat-out concupiscence, is at hand. As
springtime comes, the ice of night giving way to gentle happy growth
in the day, calm, kindly Francis Fukuyama asks us to remember to
trust the very most real thing we have: Something there is that does
not love a wall.

